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Evidence-Hearsay U.S. Const. 6th Amend. Criminal Law Crawford v. Washington
(People v. Price)

II. CONFRONTATION

First, Steven contends that admission of a hearsay statement by his spouse violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. He argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that a statement that Jamilah made to Officer Martinez[12] was sufficiently trustworthy to admit it. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) At trial, the trial court necessarily found Jamilah was an unavailable witness as to the events of July 21, 2002. (See Evid. Code, §§ 240, 1370, subd. (a)(2).) Steven had objected to this evidence, arguing that it lacked sufficient indications of trustworthiness to warrant its admission under section 1370 of the Evidence Code.[13] The trial court admitted Officer Martinez’s testimony, apparently pursuant to this statute, which would have required a finding that Jamilah’s statement to the officer was trustworthy.[14] (See Evid. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(4).)

The argument set out in Steven’s opening brief was based on the then-applicable reliability standard for admission of hearsay statements that had been enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56. Under Roberts, an unavailable witness’s hearsay statement could be admitted without violating the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause if the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability—if it either fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. (Id. at p. 66.) However, the high court recently reconsidered its ruling in Roberts, concluding that if the hearsay statement offered for its truth was testimonial in nature, its admission would violate the confrontation clause contained in the United States Constitution unless the defendant had had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the now-unavailable declarant. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369, 1374] (Crawford).) As the standard for admissibility of Jamilah’s statement to Officer Martinez changed after Steven’s appeal was fully briefed, we asked the parties to submit letter briefs on the applicability of Crawford.

First, the parties agree that Crawford applies to this case, even though it was decided after the trial court made its decision to admit Officer Martinez’s testimony. Crawford itself is silent on the issue of retroactivity. As a matter of normal judicial operation, even a nonretroactive decision governs cases that are not yet final when the decision is announced. (People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 399; People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 685 fn. 3; see Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [even new rule applies to cases not yet final].) Thus, we conclude that Crawford applies to Steven’s case, which was pending on appeal at the time that Crawford was announced on March 8, 2004.

Second, if the hearsay statement was “testimonial” in nature, its admission violates the confrontation clause unless the defendant was afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the hearsay declarant. As we conclude hereafter that Steven was afforded that opportunity, it is unnecessary to determine whether the statement was “testimonial” under Crawford and we assume, for purposes of argument, that it was.[15]

Thus, we confront the pivotal issue in this case—whether the trial court’s admission of Officer Martinez’s testimony in order to bring Jamilah’s July 2002 statement to police before the jury violated Steven’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Under section 1370 of the Evidence Code, evidence of a hearsay statement is nonetheless admissible if the statement narrated the infliction of physical injury on Jamilah, she was unavailable as a witness, the statement was made at or near the time of the infliction of injury, it was made to a police officer, and it was made under circumstances indicating its trustworthiness. (See Evid. Code, § 1370, subd. (a).) Four of these five requirements are clearly satisfied—Jamilah’s hearsay statement to Officer Martinez recounted Steven’s choking of her shortly after the incident occurred. (See Evid. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)-(3), (5).) The final requirement—that the statement was made under circumstances indicating its trustworthiness—is at issue after Crawford. (See Evid. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(4).) After Crawford, the admission of Officer Martinez’s testimony of Jamilah’s statement would only be consistent with the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution if Steven had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Jamilah. (See Crawford, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___, ___ [124 S.Ct. at pp. 1369, 1374].)

We must construe a statute in a manner that is consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize the Constitution and the statute. (See California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594; People v. Globe Grain and Mill. Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 121, 127; see also 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 95, pp. 148-149.) Construing section 1370 of the Evidence Code along with Crawford, we interpret the trustworthiness prong of subdivision (a)(4) of that statute to require a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (See Crawford, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___, ___ [124 S.Ct. at pp. 1369, 1374].)

In this matter, not only did Steven have the opportunity to cross-examine Jamilah at the preliminary hearing about the statement she gave to Officer Martinez, but he vigorously exercised that opportunity and later presented that preliminary hearing testimony to the jury in support of his defense. Steven’s counsel relied on the facts as set out in Jamilah’s preliminary hearing testimony when she made her closing argument to the jury. As we find that the evil decried in Crawford—the admission of hearsay statements when a defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine a declarant who is unavailable at trial—did not arise in Steven’s case, we find that the trial court properly admitted Officer Martinez’s hearsay testimony of Jamilah’s July 2002 statement to him.

People v. Price 6/30/04 A101668CA1/4-Hearsay/Battered Womens Syndrome

Jun 30 2004

A101668
[PDF] [DOC]

P. v. Price 6/30/04 A101668CA1/4

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People. v. Carmony 3/25/05 CA3C038802-Romero Motion
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