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iLaw Dictionary
California
Law Dictionary
Theft
(EMMI)
Theft
(EMMI)
Zurich further contends that the exception to the vehicle theft exclusion does not apply in the present case because the purpose of the exception is “to insure against theft by force or intimidation, but not by stealth.” The Court of Appeal likewise observed: “As courts in other jurisdictions have explained, the purpose of the provision is to cover a loss by theft from a car in the presence of someone in or upon it, that is, theft by force or intimidation directed at those present, but not by stealth alone.” We disagree. Nothing in the language of the policy suggests such limitation. Rather, reading the exclusionary clause and the exception in light of the broad coverage language (MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 31 Cal.4th 635), it appears most reasonable to read the exclusion as applying when the vehicle and the insured jewelry were left unattended and, hence, more vulnerable to thievery. Given the high incidence and relative ease of car theft, it is reasonable that an insurer would exclude coverage for thefts from unattended vehicles. (See, e.g., Ruvelson, supra, 50 N.W.2d at p. 634 [exclusion “obviously intended to cover any situation where a loss occurred when the property was not protected by the presence of someone in or upon the car”].) Coverage for thefts from unattended vehicles might well command an increased premium. But if the insured is “in or upon” the vehicle when the theft occurs, the loss is covered whether or not the theft is accomplished by force or by stealth. A thief, for example, may stealthily break into the trunk of a car while the insured is sitting in the car. (See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Trisko (D.Minn. 1998) 24 F.Supp.2d 985, 989, affd. on other grounds (8th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3d 951, 955-956 [police detective describing situations where thieves, using special tools, were able to break into a vehicle’s trunk unbeknownst to the vehicle’s occupant].)
Our conclusion that the exception to the vehicle theft exclusion is not limited to thefts accomplished by force or intimidation is bolstered by the fact that the language in the exception uses the term “theft” as opposed to “robbery.” Robbery requires the use of force or intimidation, while theft does not. (See, e.g. 2 Witkin and Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Crimes Against Property, § 94, p. 125 [explaining that for a robbery to occur, “the property must be taken by either force (violence) or fear (intimidation)]; People v. Ramkeeson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351 [“Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery; robbery has the additional element of a taking by force or fear.”].) The common dictionary definition of these terms also supports this distinction. For instance, Merriam-Webster’s 10th New Collegiate Dictionary, supra, at page 1222, defines theft as “the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it,” while robbery is defined as “larceny from the person or presence of another by violence or threat” (id. at p. 1013).
Significantly, the word “theft” is used both in the vehicle theft exclusion and its exception. Despite this, Zurich would have us find that the vehicle theft exclusion applies generally to all thefts from a vehicle, while the exception applies only to the greater crime of robbery. Accepting Zurich’s interpretation would require that we give different meanings to the same term used in the same policy paragraph. This would run afoul of the rule of contract interpretation that the same word used in an instrument is generally given the same meaning unless the policy indicates otherwise. (See, e.g., Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1109, 1116-1117; Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 741; People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 526.) Had Zurich intended the exception to apply only to situations involving force or intimidation, i.e., robbery, while the exclusion applied to theft, it should have used the more accurate term “robbery” to put the insured on notice. As written, a reasonable insured would not interpret the language as Zurich contends.
Construing the ambiguous language in favor of the insured, in a manner consistent with the insured’s reasonable expectations, and keeping in mind that exclusionary provisions are narrowly interpreted while exceptions are broadly construed, we hold that the exception to the vehicle theft exclusion applies when an insured is in close proximity to the vehicle and is attending to it E.M.M.I. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. 2/23/04 SC Feb 23 2004-S109609
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