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Statutory Construction New Statutes-Application General Rule-Exception-Retrospectively
Metcalf v. U-Haul

U-Haul acknowledges that Metcalf’s causes of action against it arise out of its statements in connection with commercial transactions; it concedes if section 425.17 applies to this case, it cannot be considered a SLAPP suit.  But U-Haul argues section 425.17 does not affect this case because the statute should not be applied retroactively.  We disagree.[2]

                        As a general rule, new statutes operate prospectively, not retrospectively, unless the Legislature has plainly indicated its intention to the contrary.  (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207-1208.)  No such legislative intent appears in section 425.17.  If a newly enacted statute merely changes the procedures to be used in the conduct of existing litigation, however, its application is not considered retrospective.  “[W]hat is determinative is the effect that application of the statute would have on substantive rights and liabilities.”  (Moore v. State Bd. of Control (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 371, 378.)

                        In Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, the court held that section 425.16 was procedural and could be applied to an existing lawsuit filed before the effective date of the statute.  (Id. at p. 356.)  Based on the reasoning in Robertson, the court in Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 679 held that section 425.17 could also be applied to pending actions.  “Section 425.17 does nothing more than amend section 425.16 to except certain claims from applicability of the statutorily conferred remedy of the screening mechanism provided by section 425.16; section 425.17 does not impose new, additional or different liabilities based on past conduct or deprive [the defendant] of any substantive defense to the action.  Where, as here, the Legislature has conferred a remedy and withdraws it by amendment or repeal of the remedial statute, the new statutory scheme may be applied to pending actions without triggering retrospectivity concerns.”  (Id. at p. 689-690.)

                        U-Haul argues it is improper to apply the changes effected by section 425.17 here, because its motion to strike under section 425.16 had already been made, the trial court had already ruled, and the appeal had already been filed before the section’s effective date.  But the judgment of the trial court is not final until we dispose of the case.  “The fact that a party acted in an authorized manner at the time he or she invoked the former version of a procedural or remedial statute at trial is no impediment to the appellate court applying the current version of that procedural or remedial statute when evaluating the appeal from the trial court’s ruling.”  (Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 691.)

May 24 2004

G031613 [PDF] [DOC]

Metcalf v. U-Haul 5/24/04 G031613SLAPPCA4/3