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iLaw Dictionary
California
Law Dictionary
Standard of Review-Criminal Defendant Denial of Separate Trial
(People. v. Cleveland & Veasley)
Standard of Review -Criminal Defendant Denial of Separate Trial
(People. v. Cleveland & Veasley)
Separate trials may be necessary if a codefendant has made an incriminating confession, association with codefendants may be prejudicial, evidence on multiple counts may cause confusion, there may be conflicting defenses, or a codefendant may give exonerating testimony at a separate trial. (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 932.) The charges against each defendant were identical, so there was no danger of jury confusion, and we see no prejudicial association. There was no indication that any of the defendants would have provided exonerating testimony at a separate trial. It was not clear the defendants would have conflicting defenses. But even if there were conflicting defenses, that circumstance alone would not mandate severance. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 190; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1286-1287.) Except for the danger of incriminating statements, this was a classic case for joint trial.
At trial, Cleveland argued that statements by Veasley would prejudice him, thus requiring severance. The court was very aware of the need to protect Veasley’s codefendants. It stated its intent to exclude any statements that were inadmissible against a codefendant and that could not be adequately redacted. Judging the circumstances as they appeared at the time of the hearing on the severance motion (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 932), the court reasonably concluded that redaction or, as necessary, exclusion of the statements would adequately protect Cleveland. Accordingly, the court acted within its discretion in denying severance.
“After trial, of course, the reviewing court may nevertheless reverse a conviction where, because of the consolidation, a gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.” (People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 313.) Because the trial court promised to protect the nondeclarants’ rights when it denied severance, it is especially necessary to review the actual trial to see if the court succeeded in doing so. We have reviewed the record. The statements that were admitted against Cleveland were properly admitted. The statements that were admitted solely against Veasley were adequately redacted, and the court gave adequate limiting instructions, so as to protect Cleveland.